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# U.S. Air Force Participation in the Joint Staff Intern Program

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **U.S. Air Force Participation in the Joint Staff Intern Program**

**by  
Colonel Regis Canny, USAF**

The Joint Staff Intern Program (JSIP) is a unique and prestigious opportunity for the high quality junior officers to develop professionally by serving on the Joint Staff for a period of one year. Interns are fully integrated into the policy and operational activities of the Nation's senior military staff to give them a broader perspective of operations within the military and our government. The JSIP fosters joint thinking. It provides a unique opportunity to expose junior officers to joint decision making at the highest levels of military and government authority.

The Air Force withdrew from the JSIP in the 1987-88 time frame after more than five years of involvement. The purpose of this research was to explore whether the Air Force should reinstitute participation in this program. To answer this question, interviews, surveys and review of the literature were performed. The "bottom line" of this research effort was that those involved with the JSIP (interns, senior officers and general/flag officers) valued the program highly. All levels noted that since the Air Force doesn't participate in the JSIP, the interns were not getting peer inputs on AF operations. This was perceived as a drawback in the program. Research results also show that JSIP participants believe AF junior officers, as well as the AF itself, are not getting the benefits of an excellent program.

Based on the findings from the research conducted, it was recommended that Air Force leadership review its decision on Air Force participation in the JSIP.

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
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AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE  
JOINT STAFF INTERN PROGRAM

by

COLONEL REGIS CANNY, USAF

# The Joint Staff



## INTERN PROGRAM

### PURPOSE

The above picture is the cover slide for an informational briefing on the Joint Staff Intern Program (JSIP), presented by the Personnel Services Division, J-1. The JSIP is a

unique and prestigious opportunity for high quality junior officers to develop professionally by serving on the Joint Staff for a period of 1 year. Interns are fully integrated into the policy and operational activities of the Nation's senior military staff to give them a broader perspective of operations within the military and our government.<sup>1</sup>

In this new era of "jointness" among the military services, one might ask the question, "What is wrong with the above picture?" The answer: "The Air Force isn't shown!" The Air Force withdrew from the JSIP in the 1987-88 time frame after more than five years

of involvement. The purpose of this research paper is to explore whether the Air Force should re-institute participation in this program.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The following methodology was adopted to answer the question posed in this research. First, background on the importance of "jointness" is presented. This is followed by a discussion of intern or "mentoring" programs as documented in literature. Next, the JSIP is described in detail with emphasis given to the responsibilities of both the interns and the Joint Staff directorates which participate in the program. Then data obtained from various questionnaires and interviews of those currently involved with the JSIP is reviewed. (It is not in the scope of this paper to analyze how officers who previously participated in the program, some as late as ten years ago, were impacted.) The final step in the methodology involves examining reasons why a program like the JSIP is needed in light of today's rapidly changing military environment. This paper ends with a conclusion and recommendation on whether the Air Force should resume participation in the Joint Staff Intern Program.

## **JOINTNESS**

Some say that the great success of the U.S. military in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM is a shining example of

the ability of the Nation's Armed Forces to work together to accomplish a mission critical to the strategic interests of this country. However, if one reviews history, one would be hard pressed to find other recent examples of close service cooperation. In fact, due to problems of interservice rivalry and lack of cohesive support in such military operations as the Vietnam War, the Iranian Rescue Mission, and the Grenada Invasion, steps were taken within and outside of the military establishment to mandate that the services work together as a cohesive force.<sup>2</sup>

One of the early catalysts for the latest Department of Defense (DOD) reform initiatives was Air Force General David C. Jones, who also served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1980s. As Chairman, he took the military establishment to task for its inability to conduct joint operations. He focused in on personnel policies and noted that Joint Staff officers were still primarily service oriented and the influence of this service parochialism often impacted joint thinking. General Jones notes that,

officers come from and return to Services which control assignments and promotions. The strong Service string thus attached to a Joint Staff Officer (and to those assigned to the Unified Commands as well) provides little incentive,--and often considerable disincentive--for officers to seek joint duty or to differ with their Service position in joint deliberations.<sup>3</sup>

To control this problem, General Jones proposed that more officers should have more joint tour assignments during their careers and they should be rewarded for doing so.<sup>4</sup> In addition, he urged Congress to make major changes to the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff

operated. This call started more than four years of hearings, investigations, and reports that culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, hereafter referred to as Goldwater-Nichols.

Goldwater-Nichols established many significant and far-reaching changes in the conduct of DOD affairs with the expressed purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving joint officer manning policies.<sup>5</sup> With regard to the latter, the reorganization act's Title IV (Joint Officer Personnel Policy) establishes the guidelines for joint officer management. This provision of the law includes detailed requirements and restrictions on how the services are to manage joint officers. This portion of the law is exceedingly complex and shows that the clear intent of Congress is for the services to focus personnel efforts on developing a corps of capable joint officers.

For example, the Secretary of Defense is required to publish a list of Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) and identify those that are critical positions. Critical billets are those positions which call for the assigned officer to be trained and experienced in the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces. The size and composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is the primary determinant of the services' ability to meet the exacting requirements of the law. Presently there are 9,195 positions on the JDAL with the majority of the billets being assigned to the grade of 0-5, and of this total 1,020 have been designated as critical.<sup>6</sup>

Thus in order to end service rivalry and "avert interservice bungling of a kind that had jeopardized operations in Vietnam and Grenada,...[it is now the law of the land] that the 'unified' commander in the field will have power over assets of all services."<sup>7</sup> And with strict personnel rules in the form of Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols, future operations such as the ones in the Gulf War and Somalia will be the responsibility of a unified commander-in-chief (CINC) and not a service chief. This approach to military operations is clearly articulated in Joint Pub 1 which provides guidance for how joint actions of the Armed Forces of the United States will be carried out.

Internal "friction" caused by excessive rivalries may also confront military forces from time to time. The desire to excel and the competition of differing points of view are indispensable to healthy military organizations. However, there is no place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or denigrate fellow members of the joint team; we must harness all our energies for dealing with our enemies...effective teamwork among the US Armed Forces helps reduce and cope with the various frictions associated with military endeavors.<sup>8</sup>

Jointness is now part of our national military strategy and this new culture must become interwoven within the fabric of the U.S. military. The literature documents one way of helping to make this happen.

## **REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

Considerable research has been done and many papers written on the subject of internships and mentoring, particularly in the business arena. "The mentoring phenomenon has taken root.

Hundreds of companies, including Johnson & Johnson, Bellcore, NCR Corp., AT&T Bell Laboratories, and Merrill Lynch, are adopting formal mentoring programs."<sup>9</sup> In the late 1970s, Mr. Gerard R. Roche, in the Harvard Business Review, reported survey results from over 1,200 top executives with regard to the effects that mentoring had on their careers. He noted that "Executives who have had a mentor earn more money at a younger age, are better educated, are more likely to follow a career plan, and, in turn, sponsor more proteges than executives who have not had a mentor."<sup>10</sup>

In addition, a number of articles on the topic of mentoring was published by New Management in the late 1980s. Mr. John W. Gardner, as a contributing author in this series, noted that "Programs that bring a number of young leaders together for a shared experience have an impact over and above the nature of the particular program. Just the fact of having peers singled out has a motivation effect, and contact with their peers may have considerable impact."<sup>11</sup> In addition, he also points out,

Young potential leaders should be introduced fairly early to a boundary-crossing experience. They should learn early to find their way into an unfamiliar culture, to honor that culture's sensitivities and to develop empathy for its values and assumptions. They should learn early how to mediate disputes among subcultures, to build coalitions, to negotiate.<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Michael G. Zey noted that with the rise of mergers and consolidations, it was critical that organizations view mentoring as more than just a device to foster training and development. He stressed that it must be seen as a means to continuing the corporate culture when changes take place. "A formal mentoring

program is one way to assure the continuity of the corporate culture...[after organizational changes take place]"<sup>13</sup>.

In other research, Dr Harvey White points out why mentoring and internships may be rejected by corporations; however, he also notes why such an action may not be prudent.

Although the merits of mentoring are widely recognized, top level managers often consider it an unwise investment of what is often their scarcest resource--time. The investment of time in the coaching, counseling, and nurturing of junior employees is viewed as a one way street...Few approach it as an opportunity to affect the organizational culture, or to embellish their own position in the organization. Recent research findings suggest a need to change top-level management's views on mentoring. Indeed mentoring is beneficial for the organization. It contributes to the development of managers and facilitates the process of managerial succession. It also facilitates the transmittal of organizational culture.<sup>14</sup>

White also notes, "The deliberate role-modeling, coaching and teaching associated with mentoring is one of the most effective ways leaders can embed and transmit cultural norms and values."<sup>15</sup>

Finally, Professors Burke and McKeen, writing in the Business Quarterly, note that,

A formal management mentoring program has the potential to: improve the job performance of both mentor and protege; reduce turnover in early career stages; develop sufficient talented managers to replace those about to retire; maintain high levels of managerial contribution through middle age and beyond; and prepare individuals for roles of organizational leadership.<sup>16</sup>

From this brief review of the literature on the subject of internships and mentoring, it was shown that such programs have benefits for an organization and these benefits overshadow the drawbacks that were noted. The benefits documented include:

fostering organizational culture where the environment is changing; motivating and developing future leaders; and, showing these leaders how to build coalitions and deal with disputes in subcultural settings. To determine if the JSIP is able to provide such benefits, this program's objectives and implementation are examined next.

## **THE PROGRAM**

The Joint Staff Intern Program (JSIP) was started in 1981 by the J-5 Directorate and involved one intern. By 1984, all services participated in the program. In the 1987-88 time frame, the Air Force terminated its participation. No documented information could be located, either on the Air Staff or the Joint Staff, on why the Air Force made the decision it did with regard to the JSIP. However, comments from an individual associated with this action are reviewed later in this paper when field research results are presented.

When the Air Force decided to withdraw, the Army and Navy agreed to continue to support 25 JSIP positions each. The program itself "...provides a unique and prestigious opportunity for high quality junior officers to develop professionally by serving on the Joint Staff for a period of 1 year."<sup>17</sup> Participation is limited to officers in the grade of O-3 who serve on the Joint Staff in an attached status. In effect, the "spaces" provided by the Army and Navy for this program are included within their manpower authorizations and are not counted within the Joint Staff manning

figures.

Distribution of Joint Staff intern positions follows:

	<u>OCJCS</u>	<u>J-1</u>	<u>J-3</u>	<u>J-4</u>	<u>J-5</u>	<u>J-6</u>	<u>J-7</u>	<u>J-8</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USA	2	2	3	2	8	4	2	2	25
USN	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	4	4	6	5	16	7	4	4	50

Candidates for these positions are nominated by their service personnel community, following essentially the same procedures as for permanently assigned Joint Staff officers. The Personnel Services Division, J-1, the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the JSIP, interacts with the services when new interns are needed. Nominee career briefs are provided to J-1 which in turn makes the briefs available to the directorates expecting an intern vacancy. The gaining directorate selects the intern which allows for the right match of the most qualified person with the intern position scheduled to become vacant. Thus a participant in the JSIP goes through a detailed selection process, which ensures that only high quality individuals are associated with this program. Once on the job, intern activities are governed by instructions contained in Joint Administrative Instruction (JAI) 1100.02G.

Per this instruction, "directorates are encouraged to assign interns duty that requires contact with outside organizations so that interns may better understand the relationship between the Joint Staff and other agencies."<sup>18</sup> In addition, J-Directors are required to appoint intern advisors to ensure proper administration of the JSIP at the directorate level. Such an advisor is usually

a field grade officer who has at least one year of service remaining on the Joint Staff. This individual is required to:

- Ensure that standardized procedures for the employment of interns are maintained, reviewed, and improved.
- Maintain and Intern Position Description for each intern requirement.
- Advise directorate interns on Joint Staff procedures.
- Act as a mentor to interns providing career counseling and professional guidance.
- Assist with directorate-unique training.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to intern advisors, J-Directors select interns with six to nine months remaining on the Joint Staff to serve as the directorates' intern representatives on the Intern Executive Council, a critical liaison organization (discussed below.) Joint Staff Directors also ensure that interns receive performance evaluation reports upon completion of their internships and submit recommendations for Defense awards and decorations when the situation warrants.

The Intern Executive Council, responsible for planning and organizing interagency training sessions, is an integral part of the JSIP. It ensures maximum "bottom up" participation and complements the "top down" focus which this program has been shown to have. This council is composed of directorate intern representatives who select one of the members to serve as the Executive Council Representative. This representative meets regularly with the OPR for the JSIP to discuss any pressing issues and review upcoming training activities. The Executive Council

provides another excellent opportunity for the interns to maximize their experience on the Joint Staff and to gain additional opportunities to develop leadership and management skills in a joint setting.

In summary, the JSIP is a well documented program with many check points to ensure that its stated objective, "of providing a broader perspective of operations within the military and our government,"<sup>20</sup> is met. Does it? Current participants were directly asked. Their insights are discussed next.

## **SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS**

To gain a better insight into the current JSIP, surveys and interviews, using open ended questions, were conducted with participants at these three different levels: the interns, their supervisors and the J-Directors. The survey at Attachment 1 was sent to each intern via J-1. Forty-five of the fifty interns completed and returned the form--a 90% response rate. A slightly different survey form (Attachment 2) was provided to eight of the intern advisors. Five forms were returned for a 63% response rate. Finally, personal interviews with two directors and a deputy director were conducted. Because of schedule conflicts, another director responded with a written survey (Attachment 3). Thus data was gathered from 50% of the directors who have interns in their organizations. Analysis of the data obtained from each of these three levels follows.

**The Interns:** The initial background survey and questions 1, 2

and 9 in Attachment 1 were for data analysis purposes and future research efforts. They are not germane to the research question posed in this paper and are not discussed further. The remaining questions (repeated in bold print below) are analyzed in the order they were given to the interns.

**"Did you have any prior knowledge of the size and scope of the Joint Staff prior to your entry into the JSIP?":** Six respondents indicated "yes" and the other 39 responded "none to limited." It can be concluded from this data then that junior officers, in the grade of O-3 from the Army and Navy, have little knowledge of the Joint Staff and how it might interact with their service, prior to a joint assignment.

**"In priority order, what do you feel are the greatest benefits to participation in the JSIP?":** Forty-two of forty-five responses indicated the number one benefit was "exposure to the interagency or joint decision making process" or the "big picture." From this it can be concluded, at the intern level, the greatest benefit of the JSIP is the broadening of intern perspectives of the joint and interagency process. Of the remaining three responses to this question, two noted different positive morale factors and one didn't provide an answer.

**"In priority order, do you perceive any drawbacks to participating in the JSIP? Do the Drawbacks overshadow the benefits?":** Thirty of forty-five responses clearly stated "No, the drawbacks do not overshadow the benefits" with 13 noting "None" as to drawbacks and 17 listing a variety of drawbacks (centering

around follow-on assignments and no joint tour credit). Eleven responses listed drawbacks (mainly centered around being out of one's service specialty while in the program) but did not respond to the "overshadowing" phase of the question. Only 3 answered "Yes, the drawbacks overshadowed the benefits." The drawbacks listed dealt with follow-on assignments and no joint tour credit for the JSIP. One respondent did not answer this question. Therefore, with 30 of 45 respondents clearly indicating no major drawbacks with the JSIP, it can be concluded that this is a beneficial program for the interns. This conclusion is further supported when the responses to the question, "If given the choice now, would you participate in the JSIP and would you recommend it to a friend?" are analyzed. Here, 42 responses were in the affirmative and the other 3 did not answer the question. This further shows that, from the intern perspective, the JSIP is viewed as a very valuable program.

"Has your thinking concerning a future Joint Staff or other joint duty tour been influenced in either a positive or negative way by your participation in the JSIP?": Thirty-five "Positive" responses were noted while 7 indicated that they would not wish a joint assignment in the future. The other 3 respondents didn't answer this question. Again, from this level of response, it can be concluded that the JSIP is favorably influencing officers willing to serve in joint duty assignments.

"In your perception, does the absence of Air Force participation in the JSIP have any impacts?": For this question,

the results were split. There were 24 "Yes" responses with impacts ranging from a lack of jointness at the peer level in the program to "the Air Force is sending the wrong signal." The other 21 responses breakdown into two categories, with 11 stating only "No impact to the JSIP" and the other 10 stating "No impact to the JSIP, but..." then listing impacts on Air Force junior officers. With regard to the latter category, the impacts center around a theme of the Air Force missing an opportunity to broaden its junior officers and these officers not being able to share in the benefits of an excellent program.

From these intern level inputs, an interim conclusion was reached that the JSIP can be a very beneficial program. It offers junior officers, having no or minimal exposure to jointness, an opportunity to experience first hand the "big picture" of how the military operates in the joint and interagency arena. In the process, the program creates a pool of talent that may be available for future joint assignments. Due to lack of Air Force participation, interns also noted a lost opportunity to interact with Air Force peers in a Joint Staff setting. In addition, there is the perception that Air Force junior officers are not being given the same training opportunity that their Army and Navy counterparts are who participate in this program.

**The Intern Advisors:** The advisors' viewpoint is based on the four field grade officers and one general officer who responded to the intern advisor questionnaire (Attachment 2). The advisors are directly responsible for the interns within their directorate as

well as the administration of the JSIP.

**"In priority order, what do you feel are the greatest benefits to having intern participants serving in your directorate?":** All responded that the interns represent a highly energetic and competent source of manpower that was in fact "free labor" for the directorate. They also noted that the interns, as junior officers, bring a fresh look to the issues at hand, given the senior rank structure within the directorates.

**"In priority order, identify any drawbacks associated with having intern participants serving in your directorate. Do you believe the drawbacks overshadow the benefits?":** Two drawbacks were cited. They were the lack of continuity of an intern versus an action officer (1 year vice 3 years) and the initial inexperience an intern starts with. However, all of these advisors clearly responded that, *"the drawbacks do not overshadow the benefits."* The responses to the final three questions mirrored exactly those of the interns when asked similar queries.

**"In priority order, what benefits do you see the JSIP bestowing on the intern participants serving in your directorate?":** All five advisors noted the greatest benefit was the opportunity for the interns to see issues worked at the joint, vice the service level, and to work with senior officers while experiencing the big picture.

**"In priority order, what drawbacks do you see intern participants incurring while serving in your directorate? Do the drawbacks overshadow the benefits?":** The only drawback noted was

that the interns were removed from their service specialties for a year. All respondents clearly stated that "The drawbacks do not overshadow the benefits."

"In your perception, does the absence of Air Force participation in the JSIP have any impacts?": The responses indicated that the JSIP is not impacted directly. However, each felt Air Force junior officers were impacted since these officers were not being given the same opportunities to excel as their Army and Navy counterparts who were participating in the JSIP.

From the analysis of this data, it can be concluded that the advisors hold the same thoughts and beliefs as those of the interns. Senior officers on the Joint Staff hold the JSIP in the same high regard as the junior officers participating in the program and they also see the Air Force "losing out" by not allowing its junior officers to participate in this program.

**The Directors:** Four director level general/flag officers involved with the JSIP on the Joint Staff were surveyed. While not limited to a set format, the questions asked of the three directors, where personal interviews could be scheduled, were centered around those shown in Attachment 3. Overall, these general/flag officers believe that the JSIP is a very valuable program which should be retained and involve Air Force participation. The following reasons were provided.

First, the program attracts highly competent and motivated junior officers who bring a variety of skills to the Joint Staff and provide that fresh look to issues being worked. One director

stressed that this was very important given that his organization had only 3 majors and the rest of the action officers (AOs) were O-5s and O-6s.

Secondly, the JSIP was seen as a critical source of manpower and one that would become even more valuable as the Joint Staff faces manning reductions while still being forced to deal with increased work loads mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. When asked what would be the result if this program should be terminated for any reason, it was noted that studies had found that the Joint Staff would need approximately 33 additional AOs to pick up the workload if the interns were not there. Given that the interns are so well integrated into the fabric of the Joint Staff, not to have these 50 high quality officers would be seen as a major loss.

Third, the program was viewed as valuable to the Army and Navy since it returned to these services junior officers who had a much broader view of military and world matters and who had seen decision makers perform at much higher levels than most junior officers witness. They felt that this would be of immediate benefit to the services upon the return of the interns and a future benefit to the joint world if these interns should be assigned later JDA billets.

Finally, the general/flag officers who responded mirrored the assessments of the interns and their advisors concerning the lack of Air Force participation in the JSIP. They viewed the real "losers" as Air Force junior officers who were not getting the same learning and training opportunities as their other service

counterparts. Each indicated that they would like to see the Air Force participate in this program. One director noted that it was critical to the interns in the program to get a peer perspective on the Air Force that they were now not receiving. This comment tracked with the earlier reported survey results that some interns felt they were not getting a complete joint picture because they had no interaction with Air Force peers on the Joint Staff.

During these director interviews, one Air Force general officer noted he was familiar with the reasons for why the Air Force terminated its JSIP participation in the mid '80s and he shared his thoughts on this matter. The JSIP and a similar Air Force program, known as ASTRA, were viewed as "pre-ordaining" below-the-zone promotions. It was felt that this situation penalized those junior officers who either had to or chose to stay within their career fields, doing Air Force jobs, vice volunteering for either or both of these one year assignments. Following the decision to curtail participation in the JSIP, the Air Force also eliminated its ASTRA program. At the time of these decisions, the Air Force was facing a severe pilot shortage and was doing everything it could to fill cockpits (recall pilot bonuses, increased flight pay, leather jackets, etc.). The senior leadership felt that the rated captains could not be spared for either program; therefore, it would be unfair to disadvantage one group by not allowing them to participate vis-a-vis the non-rated force. In addition, senior leadership felt that captains should be concerned with learning their jobs (recall at this time the

initiation of the new Officer Performance Report) and they could "broaden" later as majors when they had more to offer.

From the general/flag officer perspective, it can be concluded that intern participants and the directorates both benefit from the JSIP and the benefits far outweigh any drawbacks. The senior leadership on the Joint Staff views the Joint Staff Intern Program as a major source of talent and would be very concerned about impacts on workloads if this program should be terminated. Finally, lack of Air Force participation in the JSIP denies its junior officers the opportunity to participate in a beneficial program. In addition, this situation prevents the interns from getting a peer perspective on Air Force operations thus they are not getting a complete joint picture at all levels of interaction on the Joint Staff.

The findings and conclusions from this three step data gathering effort will now be evaluated in light of the environment in which the Nation's Armed Forces find themselves. After this analysis is performed, this paper will conclude by recommending the answer to the research question posed, "Should the Air Force reinstitute participation in the Joint Staff Intern Program?"

## **A CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT**

As we prepare for the future, the Armed Forces of the United States face a double edge sword--budget cuts and a changing world order. In an in depth article on military downsizing, Larry Grossman notes that,

The war in the Persian Gulf was the first major test of a new, congressionally mandated command structure... Now that the war has ended, the new command structure will face another test, one which will bring considerably less glory to the leaders responsible for it: cutting the force by 25 percent by 1995...The Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs of staff, all of whom were interviewed for this article agree on one thing: Maintaining the balance between the CINC's requirements and the President's national military strategy will become increasingly difficult as the defense budget shrinks.<sup>21</sup>

The service chiefs realize that the true test of military jointness will come over the next decade, as the Pentagon is forced to dole out shares of a force structure reduction that maybe far greater than 25 percent. Given the increased pressures that the services will face in dealing with these substantial budget cuts, it will be imperative that the services know how to work with each other, the CINCs, and the Joint Staff, not only at the senior level but the mid-range level as well. When the JSIP participants return to their service, they will bring this understanding back with them. They will be a source of talent that the Army and Navy can use at the junior level to help ensure that reductions do not impact the Nation's ability to fight jointly, as is mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The U.S. faces a changing world where the potential to employ conventional forces has increased substantially. Joint Pub 1 provides guidance for how these actions should be carried out and notes that "frictions" can develop among the Armed Services. A program such as the JSIP can help mitigate such problems since it brings together peers from at least two services and exposes them to an environment where they must learn to work together.

Interaction with peers is a vital ingredient of learning for young people. After the first few experiences in which an important endeavor is derailed by interpersonal conflict, they begin to pick up the premonitory signs of trouble to come. They learn teamwork. They learn to deal with hostility. They learn when to compromise and when to stand firm. In such a setting young potential leaders will deepen their self-knowledge.<sup>22</sup>

The JSIP provides the Army and the Navy with an opportunity to get highly qualified junior officers ready to deal with future issues that will require cooperation on many joint issues.

As the U.S. Armed Forces prepare to make substantial force structure reductions while still having to be ready to deal with a dangerous world environment, the JSIP provides an opportunity to develop future leaders familiar with joint operations. As General Jones concluded earlier, the more officers exposed to joint matters the better.

## **CONCLUSION**

From the research presented within this paper, it is concluded that the JSIP is a very valuable program, both from an individual intern's perspective as well as from the view of the Joint Staff. The lack of Air Force participation in the program may have impacts for three reasons. First, intern participants don't have the opportunity to interact with Air Force peers in a Joint Staff setting. Second, Air Force junior officers don't get to experience the benefits of a valuable mentoring program, that their Army and Navy counterparts do. Third, the Air Force doesn't benefit from the experience the interns bring back to their organizations.

As discussed earlier, General David C. Jones noted that if joint operations were to be improved, more officers should have more tours of duty in joint assignments. This concept later became the law under the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, with implementing guidance provided by Joint Pub 1. The JSIP provides an added opportunity for junior officers to experience a joint setting and helps create a pool of talented officers willing to serve in future joint assignments.

The JSIP is also a mechanism to help foster joint thinking. It provides a unique opportunity to expose junior officers to joint decision making at the highest levels of military and governmental authority. These interns return to their service with a much broader perspective of military operations and world events. Too, they experience the benefits that were documented in literature on mentoring. These include learning to build coalitions, dealing with disputes in subcultural settings, and adjusting quickly to a changing organizational setting. In addition, the Army and Navy can use their returning interns to help deal with the many joint issues that will surely surface as the military establishment draws down over the next few years. All future military operations must be of a joint nature by law. The JSIP is of great value since it affords the services an opportunity to expose tomorrow's leaders to how joint decisions are made today.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

From the research associated with this paper, the JSIP was

found to be a very worthwhile program by those involved at all levels of participation. All JSIP participants surveyed noted that Air Force junior officers were being denied access to a program that provided benefits far in excess of any drawbacks that might be encountered. Based on these findings, and since the Air Force no longer faces a pilot shortage as it did in the mid 1980s when participation was halted, recommend senior Air Force leadership review the decision which lead to terminating involvement with the JSIP. This is a well organized and well run program that provides benefits to the interns, the Joint Staff and the services participating. Only a very limited number of officers are involved--just 25 negotiable positions per service--and the tour length is only one year. By resuming involvement with the Joint Staff Intern Program, the Air Force would be allowing its junior officers to participate in a program designed to develop the future joint leaders of tomorrow.

#### ENDNOTES

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ICAF RESEARCH PROJECT  
JOINT STAFF INTERN PROGRAM (JSIP)  
DATA GATHERING FORM

NOTE: Brief and concise written answers would be appreciated. If you should need extra space for an answer, please use the reverse and annotate accordingly.

SERVICE BRANCH \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ YEARS OF SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_ MONTHS IN JSIP \_\_\_\_\_

1. Primary duty prior to entry into the JSIP and your warfare speciality (i.e. armour, pilot, etc.).

2. How did you hear about the JSIP?

3. Did you have any prior knowledge of the size and scope of the Joint Staff prior to your entry into the JSIP?

4. In priority order, what do you feel are the greatest benefits to participation in the JSIP?

5. In priority order, do you perceive any drawbacks to participating in the JSIP? Do the drawbacks overshadow the benefits?

6. Has your thinking, concerning a future Joint Staff or other joint duty tour, been influenced in either a positive or negative way by your participation in the JSIP? In priority order, list reasons why.

7. In your perception, does the absence of Air Force participation in the JSIP have any impacts? In priority order, list reasons why.

8. If given the choice now, would you participate in the JSIP and would you recommend it to friend?

9. List any major contributions you have made during your participation in the JSIP, i.e., what policies did you affect or missions did you help develop. If you are relatively new to the program and have not had such an opportunity, please so state.

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NOTE: Brief and concise written answers would be appreciated. If you should need extra space for an answer, please use the reverse and annotate accordingly.

SERVICE BRANCH \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ YEARS OF SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_ MONTHS ON JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1. In priority order, what do you feel are the greatest benefits to having intern participants serving in your directorate?

2. In priority order, identify any drawbacks associated with having intern participants serving in your directorate? Do you believe the drawbacks overshadow the benefits?

3. In priority order, what benefits do you see the JSIP bestowing on the intern participants serving in your directorate?

4. In priority order, what drawbacks do you see intern participants incurring while serving in your directorate? Do the drawbacks overshadow the benefits?

5. In your perception, does the absence of Air Force participation in the JSIP have any impact?

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DATA GATHERING FORM**

1. WHAT ARE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE JSIP PARTICIPANTS?

2. DO YOU HAVE SPECIFIC CRITERIA WHEN SELECTING JSIP PARTICIPANTS TO SERVE WITHIN YOUR DIRECTORATE? HOW DOES YOUR DIRECTORATE SELECT JSIP PARTICIPANTS?

3. HOW DOES YOUR DIRECTORATE EMPLOY JSIP PARTICIPANTS?

4. DO YOU BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY DRAWBACKS TO THE JSIP, AND IF SO WHAT ARE THEY, FOR:

A) THE JSIP PARTICIPANT?

B) THE PARTICIPANT'S SERVICE?

C) YOUR DIRECTORATE?

D) THE J-STAFF?

5. DO YOU BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY BENEFITS TO THE JSIP, AND IF SO WHAT ARE THEY, FOR:

A) THE JSIP PARTICIPANT?

B) THE PARTICIPANT'S SERVICE?

C) YOUR DIRECTORATE?

D) THE J-STAFF?

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JOINT STAFF INTERN PROGRAM (JSIP)  
DATA GATHERING FORM**

6. DOES THE ABSENCE OF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE JSIP HAVE ANY IMPACTS? IF SO, WHERE AND HOW.

7. SHOULD CHANGES BE MADE TO THE JSIP? IF SO, WHAT?

8. ARE THERE ANY LONG TERM BENEFITS OF THE JSIP?

9. IF THE JSIP SHOULD BE TERMINATED FOR ANY REASON IN THE FUTURE, WHAT IMPACTS COULD YOU FORESEE IF SUCH AN ACTION WAS TAKEN?